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CHANGING EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS:
THE RELATIVE EFFECTS OF PROPOSED CHANGES IN
COMPENSATION, BENEFITS AND JOB SECURITY ON EMPLOYEE OUTCOMES
ABSTRACT
Using survey responses from 1285 employees of a large telecommunications
organization, we examine the effects of three elements of implicit employment contracts -
compensation, benefits, and employment security. Findings suggest that employees are highly
sensitive to changes in the employment security, base pay, and medical plan cost provisions of
implicit contracts.
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Change is endemic to market-based economies and consequently to the employment
relationships embedded in them. It is yesterday's news that the terms and conditions under
which people work are changing. Accounts of these changes are widely reported. Over 70% of
the Fortune 500 multinationals report that they have restructured their organization in the past
five years. Forty percent responded that they were either in the midst of a restructuring or that it
was an ongoing and continuous process (Axel, 1993). Such restructuring often includes
changing provisions and hence expectations about the employment relationship.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that much of this change results in shifting costs and
increasing the uncertainty that employees must face in their employment relationships. Surveys
of compensation practices report increased use of variable pay. Two recent surveys of North
American employers report that about 70% use some form of incentive or bonus plan (Axel,
1993). Under the U.S. system of employment-based health care, costs are being shifted to
employees by requiring them to pay deductibles and co-payments for their health care
coverage. In 1985, 45% of U.S. employers required employee contributions; by 1992, about
82% did (Hewitt, 1994). Finally, it is believed that organizations' continuous restructuring and
downsizing have made employees more anxious and uncertain about their employment security
(Cascio, 1992). Even the rhetoric of some employers - GE offers "employability, not a career";
Union Carbide offers "a partnership in which risks and gains are shared" - signals changes in
the traditional employment relationship.
Modeling the employment relationship as a contractual exchange between the
organization and employees is common (Simon, 1951; Barnard, 1938; Rousseau and Parks,
1992; Williamson, 1975; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Such contracts take many forms, ranging
from formal ones such as those negotiated with unions and professional athletes to less formal
contracts described as bundles of expectations, often implied and unexpressed. Describing
such contracts, Rousseau and Greller (1994: 386) state, "in simple terms, the implicit contract
encompasses the actions employees believe are expected of them and the responses they
expect in return from the employer." Conceptually, these contracts are treated as
multidimensional bundles of expected inducements which serve to offset expected
contributions.
Yet the research on the impact of changes in the employment relationship on employee
attitudes and behaviors is dominated by simple bivariate models and relationships. Perhaps this
is best illustrated by the agency theory literature. Agency theory does model the employment
relationship as an implicit contract. However, the agency theory based research tends to treat
pay incentives and performance as representing the entire contract, or at least its most salient
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feature. The literature is virtually silent about other possible dimensions of the contract that may
affect employee outcomes.
The purpose of our study is to examine the effects of proposed changes in three basic
elements of the implicit employment contract - compensation (total cash and bonuses), benefits
(health care coverage and retirement), and employment security - on employee outcomes. The
outcomes assessed are employee satisfaction, intention to stay, and willingness to accept
another employer's job offer. The study is distinct in a number of ways. Conceptually, it
reintroduces the importance of analyzing multiple dimensions of the employment relationship
when studying the effects of changes on employee outcomes. Further, by simulating variations
in the levels of the three contract elements (compensation, benefits, and security), we are able
to gain some insights into the efficacy of models which prescribe multiple elements to implicit
employment contracts, since the current research into contracts is dominated by simple
bivariate relationships (e.g., agency theory).
This study may also have practical implications for virtually any employer. Since so little
is known about the effects of multiple changes in the provisions of implicit contracts, gaining
some insights into the effects of these changes on employee outcomes has the potential to help
improve managers' decisions.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
The notion that the employment relationship can be modeled as a contractual exchange
is common to many disciplines, ranging from organizational theory (e.g., Bernard, 1938; Simon,
1951; March & Simon, 1958) and psychology (e.g., Blau, 1964; Mowday, Porter & Steers, 1982;
Rousseau & Parks, 1992), to industrial relations (Doeringer & Piore, 1971) and organization
economics (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1975). The contract model defines the
exchange in terms of quid pro quos; the inducements or returns expected to offset the required
contributions (Simon, 1951, 1991; Rousseau & Parks, 1992). As noted earlier, the terms and
conditions of the exchange can be formally stipulated or, as is often the case in the employment
setting, more ambiguously with some terms stipulated and others more implicit or understood.
As Rousseau and Greller (1994: 386) noted, 'Typically, contracts are incomplete due to
bounded rationality, which limits individual information seeking (Simon, 1957) and to a changing
organizational environment, that makes it impossible (and undesirable) to specify all conditions
up front." Consequently, employees form expectations about a bundle of returns, or
inducements (e.g., pay levels and increases, health care benefits, training, employment
security, challenging work, coworker relations, etc.), which in some sense compensate for a
bundle of expected contributions (e.g., performing at or above standard, offering customers
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timely services, flexibility in work assignments, contributing new ideas, coming to work on time,
etc.) (Simon, 1951; Williamson, 1985; Rousseau & Parks, 1992). Since the employment
contract is almost universally described in terms of bundles of returns offsetting bundles of
contributions, rather than simply a bivariate return-cont ibution relationship, our study examines
the effects of proposed changes in multiple elements of the contract rather than an individual
provision. We selected three elements to study - employment security, employee compensation
and benefits - while methodologically accounting for others.
Employment Security and Uncertainty
Theories from several fields indicate that secure, longer-term contracts tend to be
preferable for both employees and employers when the work environment is complex and
uncertain (Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Williamson, 1975; Pfeffer, 1994). Their underlying premise,
which is best described in internal labor market models, is that employment security offsets the
risk and vicissitudes individuals face in the uncertain external environment. In return, employers
receive a stable, experienced workforce with some degree of flexibility to work assignments and
to introduction of new technology (Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Osterman, 1984). The logic is that
security of employment signals a long-standing commitment by the organization to is workforce.
Pfeffer (1994: 31) claims that "norms of reciprocity (i.e., implicit contract) tend to guarantee that
this commitment is repaid." Citing a review of existing empirical evidence, he states "there is no
evidence that employment security has had an adverse effect" (Pfeffer, 1994: 3).
Anecdotal evidence in the press and recent surveys suggests, however, that the waves
of restructuring, coupled with recurring reports of layoffs and downsizing, may signal a decrease
in employment security, at least in the U.S. (Henkoff, 1994; Axel, 1993). Further, surveys report
an increased use of temporary and contingent workers, which also signals less employment
security (BNA, 1991). If contemporary employers require greater flexibility to successfully
compete, then they may be shifting some of the risk to employees. General Electric's policy of
offering "employability," rather than the security implied by a "career," illustrates this shift of risk
to individuals. The logic is that employment security, rather than being offset by stable, flexible,
committed and experienced employees, is instead encouraging higher labor costs and
inflexibility. Pfeffer (1994: 31) counters the contingent worker/employability notion by arguing
that "an employer that signals through word and deed that its employees are disposable is not
likely to generate much commitment or satisfaction."
Whichever model one subscribes to, it is clear that expectations about employment
security provisions are presumed to be an important element in the implicit employment
contract.
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Hence, we hypothesize that:
H1: Employment security, other factors considered, is
1a:  positively related to job satisfaction.
1b: positively related to willingness to accept an offer from another company that
      provides such security.
1c: inversely related to intentions to search for another job.
Implicit contract models presume that individuals are risk averse and more risk averse
than organizations, which are better able to mitigate their risk among alternative investments
(Nalbantian, 1987). However, employers asking individuals to accept less secure employment
may offset this undesirable job attribute with increased returns by, for example, offering
additional pay opportunities such as performance-based pay plans. Another possibility,
overlooked in the implicit contract literature, is that individuals may differ in their disposition for
risk taking. Some may even treat risky assignments as a return rather than a consequence.
More likely, we suggest, is that employers believe that they will attract and retain "risk takers"
who are willing to take on the risk when it is compensated for by sharing the financial results.
Hence, compensation provisions may be particularly salient where employment risk is high.
Compensation
Employee compensation is clearly an important element in any employment contract
(Milkovich & Newman, 1993). Employees contract to contribute their time, talent, efforts, etc. as
required, within certain bounds, by the employer, and the employer offers payments
compensating for these contributions (Mahoney, 1989). Within the contract literature,
compensation plays a key role. Agency theory treats incentive pay as a contract which in its
optimal form matches the objectives of principal (owners) and agents (employees). Indeed, as
noted earlier, the agency based research virtually ignores other aspects of the employment
contract and has focused almost solely on incentive pay issues (Jensen & Meckling, 1976;
Baker, Jansen & Murphy, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989). In their work on implicit psychological
contracts, Rousseau and others (1992, 1994) treat compensation as a transactional element
and contrast it to more relational elements such as worker relations, challenging assignments
and the like.
Rousseau and Greller (1994) assert that the policies and mechanics of compensation
systems signal to employees, thereby influencing employees' expectations about their pay.
Annual increases, performance-based pay, seniority increases, and skill-based pay are
examples of mechanisms that imply the nature of the contract and create expectations.
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Looking beyond the employee contract literature to the considerable research on
employee compensation, we can derive some hypotheses about the probably effects employee
compensation will have on employee outcomes as part of the contract. There is, for example,
ample evidence that pay levels can affect employee attraction (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992;
Rynes, Schwab & Heneman, 1983), job satisfaction (Heneman, 1985; Miceli & Lane, 1991), and
withdrawal and intention to search for another job (Motowidlo, 1983). Based on the employee
contract and compensation literature, we predict the following:
H2: Total cash compensation, other factors considered, is
2a: positively related to job satisfaction.
2b: positively related to willingness to accept an offer from another company with
      similar pay provisions.
2c: inversely related to intentions to search for another job.
H3: Bonus pay opportunity, other factors considered, is
3a: positively related to job satisfaction.
3b: positively related to willingness to accept an offer from another company with
      similar bonus provisions.
3c: inversely related to intentions to search for another job.
Employee Benefits
Employee benefits are believed to be an important element in the exchange between
employers and employees (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992; Lucero & Allen, 1994). Employers offer
benefits to help mitigate employees' current (e.g., health care, dependent care) and future risks
(e.g., retirement) in exchange for employee contributions such as organizational membership.
Lucero and Allen (1994) argue that recent actions by employers to control costs by reducing
coverage or shifting costs to employees are viewed by employees as violations of the implicit
contract. Under the implicit employment contract model, cost containment actions by employers,
especially when unilaterally taken, are in effect reneging on implicit understandings. Reneging is
the flip side of committing, and it becomes especially problematic under implicit or incomplete
contracts, since ambiguities in understandings may exist (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Lucero and
Allen (1994: 426) believe that "it is quite possible that adverse reactions associated with the
reduction of current benefits are greater than alternative approaches to cost control." As well,
behavioral decision theory predicts that departures from status quo tend to be resisted.
Kahneman and Taversky (1982), for example, state that individuals react more adversely to the
losses of current status than they do to the loss of some future gain which sof equal value to
the current loss.
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Employee benefits have long been believed to influence organization commitment and
satisfaction (DeCenzo & Holoviak, 1990; Milkovich & Newman, 1993). Research suggests that
satisfaction with benefits increases with improved coverage and decreases with greater costs to
employees (Dreher, Ash & Bretz, 1988). Dreher et al. (1988) found that employee satisfaction
was especially closely linked to health insurance costs. There is also evidence that pensions
and health care benefits reduce voluntary turnover (Mitchell, 1982, 1983). Benefits are also
believed to influence job choice intentions (e.g., Huseman, Hatfield, & Driver, 1975).
Based on this literature, we predict:
H4: Overall benefits coverage, other factors considered, is
4a: positively related to job satisfaction.
            4b: inversely related to willingness to accept an offer from another company
                  with similar benefits provisions.
4c: inversely related to intentions to search for another job.
H5: Employee health care benefit costs (premium and co-payment), other factors considered,
      are
5a: positively related to job satisfaction.
5b: positively related to willingness to accept an offer from another company with similar
      health plan provisions.
5c:  inversely related to intentions to search for another job.
H6: Coverage for retirement needs (income and health care), other factors considered, is
6a: positively related to job satisfaction.
6b: positively related to willingness to accept an offer from another company with similar
      retirement benefits.
6c: inversely related to intentions to search for another job.
Other Factors in the Contract
The employment contract literature does not specify boundaries on what elements may
constitute the implicit understandings and expectations that constitute the "contract." The
economic and organization literature treats compensation and risk as playing the primary role.
Relational elements are included as part of the bundle of expectations in the psychological
contract literature. Implicit understandings of relational contracts tend to be unique to the
individual, however Rousseau (1989) suggests some of the variability in these understandings
may be related to employee characteristics. Length of employment, for example, may increase
employees' expectations that loyalty and hard work will be rewarded with secure employment.
There is also reason to believe that expectations about benefits will depend in part on
employees' needs, as related, for example, to their marital status and the number of children
they have (Williams and MacDermid, 1994).
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The purpose of our study is to examine the effects of proposed changes in three of the
key elements often discussed: security, compensation and benefits. We also attempt to account
for the effects of other variables that may influence employees' understandings of implicit
employment contracts. We therefore consider in our analyses the individual attributes that may
moderate the effects of the elements of the employment contract.
H7: The effects of changes in compensation, benefits and security on employee outcomes are
       moderated by employee characteristics.
METHODS
Values of the 8 elements of implicit employment contracts (employment security, total
cash earnings, bonus, portion of total earnings spent on benefits, medical plan premium,
medical plan cost-sharing provisions, pension, and post-retirement medical plan) were
experimentally manipulated using a factorial design with partial confounding (Cochran & Cox,
1957). Participants were asked to evaluate a series of mufti-attribute scenarios describing jobs
with differing levels of these pay, benefits and employment security variables. Responses were
then regressed on the explanatory variables to determine their relative effects on employees'
evaluations of jobs.
This type of experimental manipulation has sometimes been criticized as having limited
external validity due to differences in the experimental and field environments (Lane, Murphy &
Marques, 1982; York, 1989). Empirical research on the extent to which this is in fact a problem
has been limited. In a recent study of arbitrator decision-making, Olson, Dell'Omo and Jarley
(1992) found that decisions made in experimental and in field settings were highly consistent
when the decision problems were the same in both.
Studies involving the use of self-r port methodologies where participants are asked
about their reactions to their jobs have also been the subject of some criticism (Spector, 1994).
As Spector (1994: 386) points out, however, there has been "relatively little criticism in the
literature of self-reports as measures of people's feelings about and perceptions of work."
Where, as here, respondents are being asked about their affective reactions to employment
conditions, responses are generally considered to be valid indicators of their feelings.
The method employed in this study has a number of advantages. First, it provides higher
internal validity than field studies when suitable field data on control and explanatory variables is
difficult to collect (Olson, et al., 1992). Second, the method overcomes the problems of
multicollinearity often encountered in field research (Rynes, Weber & Milkovich, 1989). Third,
social desirability effects and priming artifacts associated with self-report attribute ratings or
rankings are weakened (Rynes, et al., 1983; Judge & Bretz, 1992). Fourth, a lower degree of
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self-insight is required of respondents than is the case with self-report attribute studies (Rynes
et al., 1983). Finally, requiring respondents to provide a holistic evaluation of mufti-attribute
scenarios is more similar to actual decision problems than is a self-report attribute design
(Rynes et al., 1983).
Sample
Actual employees rather than inexperienced college students were used to enhance
external validity. The full sample consisted of 2520 randomly selected employees of a large
telecommunications company. Employees were drawn from a variety of settings, encompassing
more than 50 offices from 3 business units and 11 states. Offices varied in size from 5
employees to 1000, and included small, entrepreneurial arrangements as well as large, well-
established entities. The sample also covered a broad range of occupations, including clerical,
technical, professional and management positions. Executives and bargaining unit employees
were not surveyed.
A total of 1290 surveys were returned, representing a response rate of 51%. Average
age of the respondents is 40 to 44 years, and average tenure with the company is 15 to 19
years (responses choices for these variables were defined ranges). 79% of the respondents are
married, 55% have one or more children under the age of 18, and 39% are females.
Design and Procedures
Surveys were constructed based on a partially confounded 25 factorial design in blocks
of 8 units (Cochran & Cox, 1957). 40 different surveys, each containing 8 scenarios with varying
levels of 5 of the 8 employment contract variables, were produced using this design. Three
variables (employment security, total cash earnings, and medical plan cost-sharing provisions)
were included in all of the surveys, with different combinations of the other five variables taken
two at a time. The design, which allows the estimation of main effects and two-factor
interactions, was used because of concern about the effects of information overload on
responses. A full factorial design, in which all 8 factors are uncorrelated, yields a total of 256
unique scenarios (2 X 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 X 2). Even if respondents had been willing to
evaluate all of these scenarios (and they were not), fatigue would undoubtedly have had an
effect on their judgments. Confounded factorial designs were in fact developed to address just
this issue (Cochran & Cox, 1957). Further, zero correlations are not required to assess the
effects of explanatory variables; there is ample evidence that regression weights remain stable
across cue structures varying in the amount of intercorrelation among cues (Zedeck, 1977; Lane
et al., 1982).
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We moved from 8 variable presentations to 5 variable presentations after a pretest of an
earlier version of the survey, which included 10 scenarios and all 8 variables, generated
consistently strong objections from participants that the information was overwhelming and
impossible to process with any degree of consistency. Moreover, evidence suggests that, owing
to cognitive limitations, respondents tend to base judgments on a relatively small number of
factors (Sanchez & Levine, 1989).
Surveys were mailed to employees by the participating company and follow-up letters
were sent two weeks later. Respondents mailed the completed surveys directly to the
researchers. To ensure anonymity, no identifiers were used. Returned surveys were evenly
distributed across the 40 versions.
Measures
Dependent variables. Respondents were asked to evaluate each scenario according to
three dimensions. They were asked how satisfied they would be with a job having the described
characteristics; how likely they would be to accept such a job if offered to them by another
company; and how likely they would be to look for another job if conditions in their current job
were changed to those described. A 5-point Ukert scale (1=very dissatisfied, or very unlikely,
5=very satisfied, or very likely) was used (Schmitt & laimoski, 1991).
Employment contract variables. To maximize realism, levels of the 8 employment
security, pay and benefits variables were defined in consultation with the company
compensation and benefits staff. Since the sample included a wide range of employees with
varying pay and benefits, values on many of the variables were expressed in relative rather than
absolute terms. Thus, the two levels of total cash earnings were 10% above or 10% below "your
current salary plus any current bonus." Similarly, bonus was expressed as equal to, or 10%
higher than, "the bonus you are currently eligible to receive, and pension benefits as the same
as, or 10% higher than, "those provided by your current Personal Retirement Account."
Employment security (called "work relationship with company" in the survey) was defined as
temporary ("employment would continue only as long as the project for which the job was
created continued") or core ("anticipate a long-term, full-time career with the company"). Medical
plan premium was expressed in terms of the amount the employee was required to pay for
coverage (no charge versus modest charge, e.g. $10/individual per month). The health plan
cost-sharing variable was described in terms of deductible amounts, coinsurance rates,
out-of-pocket maximums, and charges for office visits (to Health Maintenance Organizations).
Overall cost-sharing, rather than the individual provisions, was varied; -thus when deductible
amount was high, so too were the other cost-sharing provisions. Absolute amounts (e.g., $180
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deductible versus $425 for individuals) were in most cases used to define levels, which
represented current rates and higher rates. Since the charge for office visits varies across
Health Maintenance Organizations, the two levels were defined as the same as, or 10% higher
than, current charges. Overall benefits coverage was defined as "the company pays an amount
equal to [27% or 37%] of your current salary toward your benefits." The lower level of this
variable represented the current amount paid by the company (not including paid time off
benefits). Past-retirement medical insurance was varied according to the amount of contribution
that was required from the employee to pre-fund the benefit. Because company staff indicated
that this type of benefit would not normally be offered to a temporary employee, different
providers (company or an approved insurance company) were described for the two groups.
Demographic variables. Data on respondent demographics were obtained from survey
questions. Respondents were asked about marital status, number of children, education,
gender, income, geographic location, age, tenure (with the company), and health status. Health
status questions asked for a general assessment of the respondent's health (excellent, good,
fair, or poor); the number of days illness, injury or disability kept the respondent from working;
whether and how often the respondent or family members had received medical treatment
during 1994; and whether and how often the respondent or dependents had been hospitalized
during 1994.
Analyses
Because the variables appearing in the survey differed across versions, a single
regression equation could not be estimated for all respondents. The data were divided into
subsets in which all five variables were the same. Each subset included four versions, thus
there were a total of ten data sets. Each of the three outcome variables was then regressed on
the explanatory variables to assess their relative effects on respondents' judgments. Models
were estimated with employment contract variables only, with employment contract and
demographic variables, and with interaction terms to determine which combination of variables
provided the best fit with the data.
RESULTS
The effects of changes in implicit employment contracts.
We focus our discussion here on the results of the models that seemed to provide the
best fit, i.e. the models including employment contract variables only. Results are shown in
Table 1 (satisfaction), Table 2 (likelihood of accepting a job), and Table 3 (likelihood of leaving a
job). Results of other models are discussed briefly in the following section.
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----------------------------------------------
Insert Tables 1, 2, & 3 about here
----------------------------------------------
As the Tables show, we found strong support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. Employment
security (CORE) and total cash earnings (EARN) appear to be the two most important elements
of the employment contract, of those studied. The estimated coefficients on both of these
variables are significant across all equations, and the effects are all in the predicted direction.
Thus, reductions in employment security or total cash earnings tend to decrease employees'
satisfaction and their willingness to accept a similar job, and increase their interest in finding
another job. The coefficients are large relative to the range of the dependent variable (1 to 5),
and they are quite a bit higher than those on other variables in the equations. This suggests that
employees are highly sensitive to changes in these two conditions of the employment contract.
Support was also found for Hypothesis 5. While the estimated coefficients on health care
premium (PREMIUM) and cost- haring provisions (COSTSHR) are small relative to those on
employment security and cash earnings, and non-significant in a few cases, the pattern of
effects nevertheless suggests that these variables are important predictors of employees'
judgments. Estimated coefficients are in the predicted direction and statistically significant for
PREMIUM in all but one of the analyses, and in 77% of the analyses for COSTSHR. These
results suggest that increases in employee health plan costs tend to reduce satisfaction with,
and attraction to, jobs and increase the likelihood of looking for another job. It would thus seem
that employees consider this one particular benefit to be a fairly important component of their
employment contracts.
Results of the regression analyses provided mixed support for Hypotheses 3 (bonus), 4
(overall benefits coverage), and 6 (retirement benefits). Estimated effects are relatively small
and not consistently significant. Coefficients on bonus amounts (BONUS) and post-retirement
medical coverage (RETMED) are statistically significant and in the predicted direction in half of
the analyses. The coefficients are significant in only a third of the analyses in the case of
pension benefits (PENSN) and overall benefits coverage (PERBEN). Three of these variables
(PERBEN, RETMED, and PENSN) do perform relatively well in the models of satisfaction,
providing support for hypotheses 4a and 6a. Estimated coefficients on these variables are
positive and statistically significant in 3 out of the 4 models in which they are included; thus,
higher overall benefits coverage and retirement benefits are associated with higher levels of
satisfaction. These effects are not robust, however, across models of the other two outcomes.
Similarly, BONUS coefficients are positive and significant in three of the four models using it to
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predict the likelihood of accepting a job (Hypothesis 3b), but the variable exhibits less
explanatory power in the other models. It would seem, then, that these components of the
employment relationship are less salient than employment security, base pay, and medical
coverage. Yet it is clear from the above findings that employees respond negatively to real or
risked income loss. It may be that employees view the magnitude of the risk or the loss
associated with these four conditions as low compared to that associated with job security, base
pay and medical coverage. For example, the monetary implications of a reduction in overall
benefits coverage, which could include a vast array of benefits of varying relevance or
importance to the employee, may be quite different from those of a reduction in medical
benefits. Similarly, future losses (e.g., pension reductions) may induce less of a reaction than
present losses. Finally, potential gains (e.g., bonus) may generate less attention than potential
losses (e.g., higher premiums).
Other models. Partial support was found for Hypothesis 7. Overall, the addition of
demographic variables to the regression equations produce no noticeable changes in the
portion of variance explained, or on the estimated effects of the implicit contract variables. Only
two of the demographic variables exhibit any consistent pattern of effects. Respondent gender
is significant in 60% of the models, while tenure is significant in 50%. Men tend to be more
critical of jobs; that is, they are on the whole less satisfied, less likely to accept a job, and more
likely to try to leave a job than are women. Tenure is negatively related to the likelihood of
leaving a job, however the direction of effects on satisfaction and likelihood of accepting a job
varies across survey versions.
To explore these effects further, separate regression equations were estimated for men
and women, and for employees with low tenure (less than 15 years) and high tenure (more than
25 years). The results suggest that the groups in some cases respond differently to changes in
implicit contract variables. Differences in the responses of men and women to the CORE and
EARN variables tend to be small. More substantial differences were found in the reactions to
medical care manipulations. In almost half of the regression models, estimated coefficients on
COSTSHR and PREMIUM among males are two to four times the size of those among women.
One explanation for this is that women are less sensitive to changes in health care plans where
they are employed because they also have coverage under a spouse's plan. Further information
on alternative health care coverage is needed to explore this further.
No evidence was found of consistent or large differences in the responses of low tenure
and high tenure employees to the CORE and EARN variables. There do appear to be
differences in sensitivity to the COSTSHR variable. That is, low tenure employees exhibit
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stronger reactions to increases in medical plan cost-sharing provisions than do high tenure
employees. Low tenure employees tend to be younger than high tenure employees (correlation
between the two variables is .69), and may have young children and thus higher medical costs.
Surprisingly, no substantive differences were found between low and high tenure groups in the
effects of retirement benefits (PENSN and RETMED). This result may be due to the fact that the
company had instituted a major change in pension benefits one year prior to the distribution of
surveys, and all employees may therefore have been sensitized to the value of this benefit.
In a third set of regression equations, employment contract variables were crossed to
assess two-way interaction effects. There is no noticeable increase in the variance explained by
adding these terms (R-square values increase by .05 or less). Only one interaction term yields a
consistent pattern of effects. The variable representing employment security crossed with total
cash earnings exhibits statistically significant effects across all equations. The effect seems to
be one of simple magnification, thus the strength but not the direction of effects of each of these
variables depends on values on the other. It is also interesting to note that adding in this
interaction term substantially reduces the estimated strength of the effects of the medical plan
cost-sharing variable. The effect of the medical plan premium variable, on the other hand,
remains robust across all models. Further investigation of the effect of this variable is indicated.
DISCUSSION
Our results suggest that employees are highly sensitive to changes in the risks and
returns embedded in their employment contracts. Of the factors studied, employment security
and total cash earnings appear to be the most important components of the employment
relationship. Reductions in employment security and earnings tend to decrease employees'
satisfaction, decrease their willingness to accept a job with similar characteristics, and increase
their interest in finding another job.
We also found evidence that employees view medical coverage provisions as key
elements of the employment contract. Increases in the premium charged to employees for
coverage, and the portion of medical costs for which employees are responsible (cost-sharing
provisions), are associated with decreases in satisfaction and willingness to accept a job with
similar characteristics, and increases in their interest in finding another job.
Bonus pay does not appear to play a central role in influencing employees' reactions to
various employment contracts. While lower bonus opportunities appear to be related to
diminished willingness to accept a job with similar bonus provisions, the variable exhibited no
consistent relationships with satisfaction or the interest in finding another job. Similarly, overall
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benefits coverage and the two retirement benefits (pension and post-retirement medical
coverage) appear to be related to just one outcome: employee satisfaction.
Contrary to our predictions, responses to employment conditions are for the most part
homogenous across diverse employee groups. We did find evidence that men are more
sensitive than women to changes in both of the medical plan attributes (premium and cost-
sharing). Additionally, employees who have worked for the company for a relatively short period
of time exhibit stronger negative reactions to increases in medical plan cost-sh ring than do
their counterparts with longer tenure. Surprisingly, there appear to be no differences in the
responses of low and high tenure employees to changes in retirement benefits.
Limitations of the Study
Because data for this study were obtained from a single organization, generalizability
may be limited. One concern is that the reference point from which respondents evaluate
hypothetical changes in employment contracts may vary across organizations and the effects of
these changes may also vary across organizations. For example, loss of job security may be far
less threatening in an organization that has explicitly communicated the impermanent nature of
the employment relationship and where self-sel ction on the basis of risk preferences will
presumably have occurred. Similarly, moving from paying no health premium to paying a
moderate premium may have more of a symbolic impact than a change of similar magnitude
where the reference point is a premium payment of some kind. On the other hand, there is
extensive variation among survey respondents, in terms of their income and occupation, and the
contexts in which they work, and the results may therefore generalize to a variety of other
organizational settings. External validity is also enhanced by the use of actual employees, rather
than the inexperienced college students often used in experimental studies.
It is possible that the results obtained in our study were affected by the way in which
variables were operationalized. For example, the two levels of the bonus variable were defined
at current and higher levels (a gain), while those of the premium variable were defined at current
and higher amounts (a loss). Losses may be induce larger responses than gains. Since not all
variables that included a hypothetical loss (e.g., post-retirement medical coverage) exhibit
statistically significant effects, operationalization effects, if any, cannot fully account for the
result. Similarly, there was greater distance between levels of the total cash earnings variable
than of other variables. This too may have induced a larger response. Again, operationalization
effects cannot fully account for results, since variables with smaller distances also perform well
in the analyses.
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It may be that we did not fully account for the effects of all of the important elements of
implicit contracts. That is, we include elements of the economic "transactional" contract, such as
pay for services, but there are no directly measured elements of the socio-emotional "relational"
contract, such as respect, or loyalty (Rousseau & Parks, 1992). Relational contracts, however,
are highly subjective and are therefore "idiosyncratically perceived and understood by
individuals" (Rousseau & Parks, 1992: 21). By accounting for the effects of individual
characteristics, therefore, we at least partially account for the effects of individual differences in
relational contracts. For example, Rousseau (1989) suggests that employees' expectations
about employment security tend to increase with tenure. This implies that the importance of
employment security will increase with tenure. By including tenure in our analyses, then, we are
accounting for the effects of relational contracts on employees' reactions to modifications of the
employment exchange.
Implications and Future Research
Our study suggests that there are multiple components of implicit employment contracts
that are central to employees' responses to their work environment. The returns that employees
most value, and perhaps expect, in exchange for their contributions go well beyond direct pay
provisions. Employment security appears to be at least as important, if not more so, than
compensation. Income security, provided by benefits such as health insurance, would also
seem to be very important. These findings imply that employees' reactions to changes in implicit
employment contracts are based not only on changes in the returns, but also on changes in the
risk structure. Our results thus suggest that theories of employment contracts, such as the
agency model, need to be elaborated to include other elements of the contracts, such as
employment security and medical coverage.
In contrast to narrowly focused theories like the agency model, psychological contract
models may not be explicit enough. The theory specifies, in general terms, the process by which
psychological contracts are established, their characteristics, and the consequences of violating
them, but not their content. Emphasis is placed on the subjective and developmental nature of
psychological contracts, and thus their uniqueness to the individual and the context. Our
findings indicate, however, that there are certain elements of employment contracts that are so
central as to be common to most implicit contracts. Financial returns and protection, as well as
the promise of continued employment, appear to be such key elements of the implicit
employment contract.
Our findings suggest that future research on the effects of various employment contracts
needs to be more mufti-dimensional. Studies of the effects of variable p y provisions, for
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example, need to account for what our findings suggest are the significant effects of
expectations about employment security and benefits (particularly health care).
This study begins to explore the potential effects of changes in components of implicit
employment contracts about which empirical knowledge is limited. Empirical research on the
effects of contingent employment provisions is virtually non-existe t. Research on the effects of
employee benefits is also very limited (Williams & MacDermid, 1994). It may be premature to
suggest major implications for practitioners without further research. Our study does, however,
suggest that viewing human resource innovations in an exchange framework, especially in
terms of returns and contributions, may be beneficial.
The current study does not address many of the issues raised about the effects of the
fundamental changes occurring in the employment exchange. Employees expect some returns
in exchange for their contributions to the employer. The returns are changing: promotions,
raises, protection from loss of income (due to injury, illness, old age, etc.), and continued
employment can no longer be expected in return for loyalty and hard work. While our study
suggests that such violations of implicit contracts will induce significant changes in attitudes, we
do not examine the effects on actual behaviors. Do employees lower their contributions when
they perceive reductions in the rewards? What is the effect on employee attraction,
performance, and retention?
Research is also needed on the effects of other changes not examined in this study. For
example, the intrinsic rewards of social interactions in the workplace are being reduced in many
organizations moving to "virtual" offices, where employees work at home or on the road, but not
in an office. Similarly, the combination of flattening job structures and downsizing has
substantially reduced the promotion opportunities for employees in many organizations. Finally,
as stated above, our study does not fully examine the effects of changes in relational contracts.
A third line of research is needed to explore what employers are expecting in return for
the rewards they give to their employees. It would seem that loyalty is becoming less of a
concern. If so, then there are clear complications for the design of human resource policies and
procedures.
Studies of a similar nature conducted in other organizations would provide information
about the extent to which the results of our study generalize to other settings. An examination of
the effects of differing operationalizations of variables would also be informative.
Changes in employment contracts is a topic of enormous interest to both researchers
and practitioners. Our findings suggest that modeling the exchange between employees and
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employers in terms of bundles of expectations about returns and contributions provides a rich
framework for theoretical and empirical research.
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TABLE 1
Regression Estimates of Factors Affecting Satisfaction
Regression Model
Explanatory Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CORE 1.25** 1.01 ** 1.27** 1.35** 1.05** 1.11 ** 1.04** 1.32** 1.30** 1.39**
EARN 1.06** 1.07** 0.94** 0.86** 1.18** 1.22** 1.13** 1.05** 1.03** 1.08**
COSTSHR 0.29** 0.18* 0.27** 0.20** 0.14* 0.24** 0.29** 0.13 0.22** 0.21 **
BONUS                                            0.12 0.11 0.27** 0.22**
PERBEN 0.19** 0.07 0.15* 0.18*
PREMIUM 0.48** 0.23** 0.28** 0.30**
PENSN 0.20* 0.14 0.22** 0.17*
RETMED 0.17* 0.10 0.14* 0.21**
R2 .43 .33 .40 .41 .40 .44 .36 .42 .43 .44
N 784   699   620   764   738   659   667   849   862   884
Note: Cell entries are beta coefficients; blank cells indicate that the variable was not Included in the model
N = number of respondents * 8
** p<.01 * p<.05
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TABLE 2
Regression Estimates of Factors Affecting Likelihood of Accepting a Job
Regression Model
Explanatory Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CORE 1.04** 0.80** 0.82** 0.96** 0.79** 0.88** 0.98** 0.99** 1.08**       1.16**
EARN 0.86** 0.90** 0.61 ** 0.70** 0.97** 0.84** 0.93** 0.81 ** 0.92** 0.90**
COSTSHR 0.29** 0.18** 0.30** 0.21* 0.12 0.35** 0.26** 0.05 0.15* 0.20**
BONUS 0.17* 0.15 0.28** 0.22**
PERBEN 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.19*
PREMIUM 0.34** 0.22** 0.22** 0.09
PENSN 0.05                -0.02 0.12 0.11
RETMED 0.18* 0.20* 0.06 0.14
R2 .30   .22   .16   .22   .23   .23   .30   .23   .28   .30
N 784   699   620   764   738   659   667   849   862   884
Note: Cell entries are beta coefficients; blank cells indicate that the variable was not included in the model
N = number of respondents * 8
** p<.01 * p<.05
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TABLE 3
Regression Estimates of Factors Affecting Likelihood of Leaving a Job
Regression Model
Explanatory Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CORE -1.47** -1.19** -1.65** -1.47** -1.22** -1.43* -1.17** -1.52** -1.38** -1.55**
EARN -0.87** -0.88** -0.72** -0.67** -0.98** -0.72** -0.86** -0.80** -0.85**     -0.89**
COSTSHR -0.25** -0.17 -0.25** -0.12 -0.14 -0.21 -0.28** -0.19* -0.15 -0.23**
BONUS -0.18* -0.12 -0.06 -0.15
PERBEN -0.15 -0.00 -0.09 -0.13
PREMIUM -0.34** -0.20* -0.24** -0.16*
PENSN -0.09 -0.06 -0.20* -0.15
RETMED -0.13 -0.15 -0.13 -0.19*
R2    .36    .27    .36    .32    .33    .31    .30    .35    .34    .38
N 784   699   620   764   738   659   667   849   862   884
Note: Cell entries are beta coefficients; blank cells indicate that the variable was not included in the model
N = number of respondents * 8
** p<.01 * p<.05
